

Research Article

Revisiting Burkina Faso Military Coups of 2022: Implications on West African Democracy

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Abstract

There-emergence of coups in West Africa is a 21st century trend. The purpose of this study was to analyze the nature of the coup(s) in Burkina Faso and its impact on West African democracy. The study, which was designed qualitatively in an exploratory manner, provided data to be analyzed and presented in a systematic and theoretical approach, allowing it to explain the reasons for the military coup d'état in January and September 2022, which impacted on the democratic process in Burkina Faso due to the increased popularity and acceptance of the junta headed by Captain Ibrahim Traore. The study also found that, the euphoria that accompanied the Burkina Faso coups also facilitated the change of governments in another neighboring West Africa country – Niger – in the context of the absence of political leadership, economic crises, weaknesses in state institutions and security issues. The study also found that today's military coup resurgence in West Africa is a failure of state governance and democratic processes as people prefer to have an authoritarian regime. The Study recommended on public interest and return to democratic rule in Burkina Faso, enhancement of ECOWAS peer-review mechanism on governance for member-countries, other measures to counter the frequent coup d'etats in Burkina Faso and West Africa.

Keywords: Coup; Democracy; Military and Military Regimes

INTRODUCTION

Military coups and authoritarianism are ridiculous to democracy. One of the biggest challenges for the campaign of democratization and development in West Africa in recent two decades has been the re-emerging praetorian rule in the region. Burkina Faso, in the Sahel region, currently under a military regime had gained popularity across West Africa, perhaps serving as an inspiration for coups in countries under civilian government. This scenario has indeed raised serious concerns and regional anxiety about continued resentment against democracy and the future of political development and stability in the sub-regions.

In history, military coup in Sub Saharan Africa goes back to 1963 when the first military coup was recorded in Togo. The first President of an independent Togo was shot outside the US Embassy in Lomé on 13 January 1963 (Willoughby, 2013). The coup was led by the Sergeant Major Emmanuel Bodjolie. On 15th January 1966 another military coup took place in Nigeria led by Major Chukwuma Nzeogwu of Siollun, 2016. Ghana also had a successful military coup d'état on 24th February 1966 led by General Joseph Ankrah. The Ghanaian people accepted this military coup d'état, and the end of President Kwame Nkrumah, to whom they were once thankful for freeing them from the British colonial government (Harvey, 1966). Coups have been repeated since then, almost for the same reasons as in the early military coups of the last five decades (Williams, 2025).

In recent years, the Sahel region experienced so many social, political and economic shocks that have been hard-hitting. The recent military coup wave in the last five years (2018-2022) has highlighted the concept of a " leadership crisis" in the struggle against socioeconomic failures, terrorism and violent extremism (Queme, 2022). In other words, Adetuyi (2022) noted that over the last two decades, the number of military coups across the African continent seemed to be declining until the recent wave of military takeovers in Mali, Guinea, Chad, Burkina Faso and Sudan. Since the start of 2020, there have been six coups and attempted coups throughout Africa. Many of these coups have been condemned by the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), who have suspended memberships and imposed economic sanctions on the countries involved, while calling for a return to democratic rule. There had been five coups in the Sahel since 2020.

The 24 January 2022 coup in Burkina Faso was the fourth military coup in Africa since the Mali coup of the 10th of September 2020, and the ninth military coup (including eight successful and one failed) since the country gained independence. The 24 January 2022 coup in Burkina Faso was the fourth military coup in Africa since the opening of the decade with the coup in Mali on the 10th of September 2020 and the 9th military coup in the country since independence (Mwai, 2022). Lieutenant-Colonel Paul Henri Sandaogo Damiba led a military coup that toppled President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré's government. Sandaogo Damiba was sworn-in as interim president of Burkina Faso some weeks later. His government was supposed to rule Burkina Faso for 30 months during a transitional Period prior to democratic elections (Reuters, 2022; AlJazeera, 2022). The transition wasn't, however, as successful as hoped. The coup of 30th

September 2022 cut short the erstwhile “transition phase” which was to be concluded by July 2024 (Madubuegwu et al., 2025).

Based on the analysis above, this paper therefore seeks to analyse the factors that triggered the military coups in January and September 2022 in Burkina Faso, as well as the impact of these coups on democracy and regional stability in West Africa. The discourse is organised into an introduction, conceptual analysis, theoretical analysis, the military coup in Burkina Faso in 2022 and the impacts it has had on the democratic process in West Africa, and conclusion with recommendations.

CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS

Military Coup

A coup d'état is usually understood as an overthrow of power by the military. But political science offers many definitions of what constitutes an army coup. In this sense, Luttwak (1980) said that a coup d'état is the penetration of the apparatus of the State by a small group of individuals in an important sector, often employed to displace the government. Malaparte (1971) also noted that in some coups, the active group seizes physical control of government institutions, including power plants, streets, and means of communication, and takes control of leadership positions. When the opposition does not weaken the plotters- an opposition that fails to move them off the pedestal and gives them time to consolidate and thus give their coup legitimacy- the coup succeeds (Okechukwu, 2022). Likewise, Madubuegwu (2025) stated that a military coup is the 'invasion of political power' with the intention of controlling the government's power structures with a view to ensuring the promulgation of intentions as public policies in the name of legitimacy and tight grip of the State resources.

Bolarinwa (2023) suggested that military coups d'état have long been a feature of international politics and history. Scholarly investigation of military involvement in politics has long attracted interest. Various concepts capture military integration in different roles in national governance. In this respect, Morris Janowitz distinguished four types of political-military elites. These models are aristocratic, democratic, totalitarian and garrison State models. However, an effective democratic system that observes, controls, and manages the armed forces can help mitigate military dictatorship, and the models vary (Janowitz 1957).

Subsequently, Krausa (2007) indicated that military coups have played a crucial role in initiating political regime alterations throughout history. During the 20th century, a multitude of military coups and attempted coups occurred, not solely in developing countries, but also in Europe. Hence, scholars and experts have extensively analyzed military coups, exploring their objectives, classifications, contextual factors, procedural aspects, and probability of success. There are various theoretical frameworks available that examine the involvement of military forces in political matters, to classify and evaluate these efforts based on their goals and fundamental factors. The aforementioned variables increase the probability of a military coup and establish the basis for developing an early warning system (Edwin, 2011).

It is therefore elaborated that on the notion of *coup d'état* as an unconventional approach to the transfer of state leadership then it involves the use of illegal means by the military or other privileged factions. This procedure may entail the utilization of coercion or the mere intimidation of it; however, it does not inevitably culminate in any mortality. In the context of a discourse on a military coup, one could posit that the involvement of armed forces constitutes an indispensable element. A coup d'état may entail the involvement of a heterogeneous range of military units, rather than a singular armed force (Josef, 2021).

Furthermore, Krausa (2020) characterized coup as a purposeful endeavor executed by a fraction of a state's military, police, or security forces to overthrow the current government. Coup attempts often entail the convergence of heterogeneous military factions. In contrast, the modification of a governing body takes place without significant participation, thus distinguishing coups from revolutions. Hence, the terminology "plot" is utilized interchangeably with "coup" in the milieu of political turmoil. Arguably, Williams (2017) posited that a plot is a clandestine operation carried out by a group of insurgents to overthrow the top leadership of a particular country. This particular form of undertaking lacks inclusivity towards the wider population and is distinguished by meticulous strategizing and arrangement, culminating in an abrupt and concise implementation. The phenomenon of regime changes that involve military participation is commonly observed. The military possesses the necessary capabilities, hierarchical organization, and obedience to authority that typically facilitate the successful execution of a *coup d'état*. In numerous instances, they might be the only entity with the capacity to execute said action.

Nonetheless, Carl (2022) revealed that the mere capacity of a military to carry out a coup does not inevitably indicate its inclination to participate in such an endeavor. There must be valid rationale for the integration of military forces in political matters in such a manner. Many scholars are motivated by a militaristic drive to carry out a coup. The dominant viewpoint regarding this issue posited that military establishments tend to intrude into the realm of politics when their institutional concerns are not being satisfactorily catered to or are being jeopardized by the prevailing governing regime. This argument therefore suggests the presence of a negative correlation between the budget allocated for defense and the incidence of coups. Specifically, a higher probability of coups is associated with lower defense budgets, whereas states that allocate a greater proportion of their budget towards military spending are less susceptible to coups. Putschist armies, which are military factions that aim to overthrow a government, often resort to violent confrontations and hold differing strategic and tactical perspectives from civilian leadership.

Basically, the aforementioned phenomenon may be associated with the military's self-perception as a unique social entity or its inclination towards social differentiation. Taking a broader perspective, it is relevant to contemplate not only socio-political and economic necessities but also wider values. Hence, the scenarios where the dominant political regime's principles do not align with those of the lower-ranking officials, the latter may feel compelled to champion the interests of their particular societal group. Again, Williams (2017) asserted that the preconditions and rationale for coups d'état entailed the confluence of various circumstances. Notwithstanding

the military standpoint, there exist numerous issues involving economic, political regime, social, strategic, and military dimensions.

Irrespective of varied interpretations in what democracy implied it remain a deviance to democracy and democratic process.

DEMOCRACY

Bolarinwa (2023) opined that the popularity of democracy as a system of government in the contemporary world is subject to argumentation. Interestingly, over the past three decades, there has been a notable rise in the global demand for this particular political system. While it is widely acknowledged that democracy does not possess the capability to address humanity challenges, it is equally important to recognize that numerous predicaments cannot be effectively resolved in the absence of democratic principles. The prevalence of this particular system of administration in contemporary society has led to its widespread acceptance and underscored the need for its implementation and long-term viability. Various scholars have formulated diverse conceptualizations of democracy (Bolarinwa and Adeleke 2020).

Also, Olukoya (2022) posited that the concept of democracy may be interpreted diversely to include several notions such as a methodology, a procedural framework, a societal structure, an ideological construct, a platform for competing for power, and notably, a manifestation of class conflict. It is further argued that democracy has undergone a significant transformation from its original classical concept, which was based on the principles of governance by the people, the pursuit of the common good, the rationality of individuals, and the simultaneous pursuit of liberty and equality. Classical democracy has faced criticism due to its philosophical inconsistency, abstract character, and lack of empirical evidence supporting its premise, particularly regarding the rationality of human nature. The aforementioned restrictions have had detrimental effects on democratic theory, as they embody distinct attitudes towards the democratic endeavor and present significant challenges for democratic practices.

Arguably, concept of democracy denotes principles and systems that accord supremacy and relevance to people's preference in governance and politics. As a principle, it expresses liberty, equality and tolerance and, as a system. It is therefore a people-driven government. In the literature of Political Science "democracy" as a term is used in three senses as remarked (Odock, 2006). In the first sense, democracy is used to describe a system of government in which ultimate power (or sovereignty) rests with the people against other forms of government in which the final decision-making power rests with an individual (monarchy) or with a small member (aristocracy). In another perspective, the term democracy is used to describe a system of government in which the powers of government are divided amongst different institutions such that some institutions are responsible for making laws, while others are responsible for executing laws and yet a third institution may be responsible for mediating or adjudicating in disputes between individuals or groups who violate the laws of the land. Also, democracy can be discussed in terms of the procedures by which a political system is governed. In most democracies, an essential procedure by which most essential decisions are taken is to subject them either to a popular election, a plebiscite or a

referendum. To this end, a country's democracy is assessed from the perspectives of the operational system and institutional roles of the government and the political process (Egbo and Madubuegwu, 2018).

Subsequently, Coppedge (2002) stressed that democracy is also widely regarded as one of the most intricate concepts within the field of political science. This phenomenon's comprehensive and multifaceted nature has yet to be quantified and may remain immeasurable. Thus, there exist numerous other systems of governance that also encompass various patterns, subtypes, and variations of decision-making procedures that have also been categorized as democratic, hence posing challenges in maintaining clarity and understanding. In this vein, Bolarinwa (2023) argued that the diverse application of democratic principle results in a proliferation of distinctions and certifications. Traditionally, democracies can be categorized into many types, including liberal or republican, direct or representative, consensual or majoritarian, and market or socially orientated. In recent times, additional forms of democracy have gained importance, including participatory, deliberative, and grassroots democracies. Furthermore, alternative models such as skewed democracy, and nonpartisan democracy have also emerged. Ultimately, when examining the global evolution of democracies, it is worth contemplating the potential for a distinct Islamic transformation of democracy or the emergence of socialist and anarchist approaches to democratization. These possibilities have the potential to broaden the conceptual boundaries of democracy in the future. In any given setting where democracy is present, two interrelated factors must precede the emergence and subsequent progress of the democratic concept. The first aspect pertains to the historical resolution of the conflict between democracy and representation. The second aspect involves the broadening of this term beyond its application solely to the categorization of state and government, to encompass the characterization of a specific societal structure as well (Umaru, 2019).

Significantly, democracy thrive in attitude, institution and process to underscore essence of principle and practice. In this paper, the adverse effects of military coups on democratic process of Burkina Faso and West Africa will be examined.

THEORETICAL ANALYSIS

This paper draws on and utilises systems theory. From Burkina Faso to a neighboring State in the West African region, the theory is motivated by the intensity and extension of the military coup "detente". Systemic occurrences and trends again reflect the coup's impact on democracy in the West African sub-region and in Burkina Faso.

In other words, the need for a systems theory approach to political analysis reinforces the relationship between political science and other social sciences (interdisciplinary research), such as David Easton's political system, Gabriel Almond's structural functionalism, and other work by Harold Lasswell and Samuel Huntington (Madubuegwu and Okafor, 2017). In this direction, Johari (2005) embellished that the introduction of the systems analysis in social science owes its genesis to the realization of some leading American writers like David Easton, G. The two Almonds and Morton. A. Kaplan who has reacted against the rigid compartmentalization of any

discipline belonging to the world of social science like economics or politics, psychology or sociology, that in their views has resulted in nothing else than a reduction of than a reduction of the cross flows between various sister fields of study. Also, Mahajan (2008) stressed that “the central proposition of the systems theory is that all social, including political, phenomena are inter-related and they affect each other. It is assumed that it is not possible to understand one part of the society in isolation from the other parts, which affects its operation”. Therefore, “system” as the unit of analysis of the systems theoretical framework refers to a collection of parts that are constantly interacting to maintain and sustain the system. From this perspective, Hara Das and Choudhury (1997) identified two key attributes of a system.

1. It consists of individual components connected to carry out specific tasks. Removing any unit directly affects the others. As seen in the submission by Hara Das and Choudhury, these features invariably emphasised the extent of interrelatedness among mutually constraining or conditioning units of the system, character is ed by differentiations. Systems have reflective properties, Apter (1978) pointed out, in a more succinct sense. Systems have boundaries within which there are functional interrelationships primarily based on a certain amount of the communications;
2. Systems are broken down into sub-systems: exchange occurs between the sub-systems (as, for secondly, among states, cities and the national government (e. g., between a city and a State, or a State and the national government).
3. Systems have a capacity for coding-that is, they take information inputs, can learn from Input, and encode input into some sort of output.

Subsequently, the basic assumptions of systems theory are obvious under the following:

- a. A whole (ie system) made up of various units, parts or sub-systems.
- b. Units are further broken down within each sub-system.
- c. Functions and boundaries delineate the distinctiveness of these units/ sub-systems of the system.
- d. A set of relationships and messages between the units that reflects the interrelationship and integration of the system.
- e. The failure or disconnection of a specific unit or sub-system has an impact on other units.

Appropriately, systems theory’s logic and assumptions are relevant to this study. Firstly, West Africa is a system of sub systems (countries) that constantly interact and relate to one another for regional stability and development. The successive coups in Burkina Faso in 2022 were invariably a function of systemic failures that undermined the democratic process, reflecting the systemic character of contiguity and effects within the region. Similarly, the drivers of military coup resurgence in West African states can be analysed from multiple (political, economic, sociological and otherwise) perspectives, highlighting the systemic nature and patterns of intensity and spread. Furthermore, the effects of two successive military coups in Burkina Faso undermine democracy through multifaceted factors, underscoring its systemic character. The

results where coup detain Niger in the background of other systemic factors in failed leadership, insecurity, a poor State economy, etc.

The next argument systems theory uses is the dysfunctionality, or disarticulation, of a specific unit or sub-system. To summaries, the lack of governance, economic stability, security and social cohesion in Burkina Faso resulted in a military takeover of civilian political power, which is usually systemic in nature. This same trend of dysfunctionality inexorably led to other coups in Burkina Faso and other countries. Moreover, the domestic situation that could have shaped the military putsch in Burkina Faso and its impact can be interpreted and analysed systematically in terms of character and trend.

BURKINA FASO MILITARY COUPS OF 2022 AND IMPLICATIONS ON WEST AFRICAN DEMOCRACY

Basically, Ouedraogo (2023) remarked that since 2016, Burkina Faso has been engulfed with extremist violence. This crisis has progressively extended with at least 40% of Burkina Faso territory under the control of different terrorist factions of the Islamic State in the Sahel and Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM). Against the backdrop of this progressively deteriorating security situation, the country recorded two coup d'états in 2022 which further cast a shadow on the path to a stable democratic society. In January 2022, Lieutenant Colonel Damiba overthrew President Kaboré –the first democratically elected civilian President in the country's history citing the latter's incapacity to resolve the crisis only to be overthrown by Captain Traoré eight (8) months later in September, 2022.

In a historic sense, Burkina Faso was a former French colony that gained political independence in 1960 embedded with a long history of military rule and coups. Blaise Compaore was the former president who took over the political power in 1987 and was ousted in 2014 through popular uprising when he attempted to amend the constitution for the extension of his rule. This was followed by elections held in 2015 and 2020 that saw President Roch Marc Christian Kabore elected and re-elected respectively in polls that was described to be fair but deadly challenged by the ongoing insecurity (Conley, 2021). Also, Schultes (2022) opined that prior to the 2022 coups, the integrity of elections and civil society space have been severely deteriorated in Burkina Faso whereby all related "rights indicators" scored lower since 2019 than 2010. There is also restriction to freedom of expression and digital rights and different strata of the society. The Burkina Faso people were largely unable to enjoy equality of civil liberties coupled with the worsened security condition as a result of the prevalence of armed conflicts and violence against civilians by non-state actors in the country. The deteriorated situation of security and the inability of government to contain armed extremist groups are described as triggers for the coup in 2022.

On January 23, 2022, as a result of a fierce gunfight in Ouagadougou, the rebel soldiers have taken control of the military base in the country's capital. The unrest took place one week after the arrest of 11 military personnel accused of preparing a takeover. On 24th January, the soldiers under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba have surrounded and took over the national television building. On air, they declared that they took power in the

country, put under arrest President Roch Marc Christian Kabore, dissolved the government and the parliament, suspended the constitution and closed air and land borders. In the declaration, pronounced from the name of Patriotic Movement for Safeguard and Restoration (Le Mouvement Patrotique, Pour Sauvertage et Restauratio-MSPR), it was said that the coup was organized without violence and the detained individuals are safe. Burkinabians came out into the streets of Ouagadougou and excitedly greeted the overthrow of President Kabore who has seemingly lost public support (Madubuegwu, et al 2025). Again, Kabore's government was blamed to have failed to contain the situation of insurgency by jihadist groups in the north. This military coup was described not to have fallen short of expectation considering the dissatisfaction of security forces, a growing lack of support for the government due to the report of the absence of food for weeks at a military base in Inata before they were attacked by an armed group in 2021 leading to the death of 49 military officers and four civilians (Olukayode, 2022).

The euphoria of public acceptance of the January 2022 coup resonated from the authorities' inability to confront the violence of Jihadist groups in Northern and North-Eastern border territories of the country. Terrorism of Islamic State in the Greater Sahara and Ansar-al-Islam has claimed more than 2000 lives, displaced 1.5 million people as 1000 schools were closed (in the northern region) and 3 out of 21 million of the country's inhabitants are starving due to the droughts and relentless violence (Madubuegwu, et al, 2025). The military presence of France on their territory was another reason for discontent for Burkinabians who thinks the French troops are only imitating the Jihadist fight without no impact regarding solving problems of eliminating the militants. A national interim government was established where Colonel Damiba proclaimed himself as the president. By capturing the power, the army announced the creation of the Patriotic Movement for Safeguard and Restoration (MPSR), which, according to Reuters, include all the rebellious military divisions. The movement led by P.H. Damiba, who after the publication of the country's Basic Law on February 1, became the president of Burkina Faso. In this document, the events of January 24, 2022, that have led to the resignation of president M.Kaboré government and the parliament, as well as the transfer power to the military forces and the security organs are characterized as the legitimate and popular (Sadovskaya, 2023; William, 2024).

However, Madubuegwu, et al (2025) revealed that eight months later on 30th September 2022 that lower rank-soldiers led by Captain Ibrahim Traore staged a coup against Damiba. The second military coup within one year did not come as a surprise. Frustration within the army about lack of success in the fight against the jihadist groups is ever-present. Lower rank-soldiers since long have been feeling ignored by the military leadership. Beside the number of Jihadist attacks has increased within the past six months despite Damiba's announcement to make the "fight against terrorism" the top priority of the transition government. In contrast to the January coup, the one of 30th September was a typical "coup from below" (committed by lower ranks who do not see any chance to prevail within the army). Traoré supported Damiba's coup in January and was a member of the MPSR from the beginning (Kandeh, 2004).

In reference to the exacerbating factors/triggers, it was argued that failed political leadership of President Roch Marc Christian Kabore to secure the nation and improve the living conditions of Burkina people created widespread public discontent that led to January, 2022 coup. On the

other hand, worsening insecurity crisis, disillusionment among many officers in the army and deteriorating socio-economic woes triggered the coup of September 2022 against the government of President Damiba by Captain Ibrahim Traore.

Consequently, the public resentment and coups which followed in Burkina Faso invariably reinforced courage to challenge authoritarian regimes in neighboring West African states. Zambakari (2023) noted that on July 26 2023, Niger's President Mohamed Bazoum was incarcerated in his office in the morning by the presidential guard and it was disclosed by the presidential office on social media initially as "anti-republican mood" by the elite military unit, which ended up becoming a military coup by the end of the day when a ten-member group of high-ranking military officers appeared on the national television and declared they had deposed the government as a result of the deteriorated situation of security and inadequate economic and social governance embedded in Bazoum's government.

Niger since its political independence in 1960 from France, the military has continued to play a major role in shaping the political history of the country and domestic political crises have been historical triggers for military interventions. In 2010, President Mamadou Tandja's government was overthrown by the military after he attempted to unlawfully extend his term in office for the third time and the coup was instrumental toward the beginning of democracy in the country. Even in 2011, the threat of military coups lingered following the election of Mahamadou Issoufou as well as the first democratic change of government in 2021, which saw Issoufou's long-time party colleague Mohamed Bazoum assumed the presidency. Similar to the outcome of the resurgence of military coup in Mali and Burkina Faso, countless of Nigeriens took to the streets of Niamey and some regional centres after the military seized power to support the military takeover by attacking the French embassy and the headquarters of the ruling PNDP- Tarayya party. A political scientist in the country Abdourahmane Idrissa, described the coup to not only mark the violent end of democracy but also reflected the failure of democracy in the continent (Tschörner, 2023). The 2021 election of Bazoum was internationally hailed to be the first democratic transfer of power in the history of the country in spite of allegations of several irregularities and massive protests. The government issued a decree in 2022 that made it almost impossible for nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to operate with the imposition of bureaucratic hurdles and requirement to ensure their programmes are in alignment with the governmental priorities. In addition, differences between the military and Bazoum's policy toward insecurity from the growing threat posed by jihadist violence could be another motive behind the military coup (Yabi, 2023). Bazoum advocated for the use of dialogue approach for political conflict resolution by negotiating with jihadist groups, demobilize and reintegrate Nigerien combatants and reduce intercommunal tensions with the help of local mediation initiatives. However, the approach totally contradicted the position of military leadership in the country and some oppositions criticized the dialogue initiatives as a sign of the government's weakness and inability to guarantee the security of its citizens. The release of terrorist prisoners and the plan of government for reintegration whereby the President described them "*stronger and more battle-hardened*" than the army was perceived as condescending by the army and citizens. Bazoum's dismissive attitude toward the military governments in Mali and Burkina Faso was also considered as a strategic mistake by the military leadership. Brigadier General Abdourahmane Tiani was accused to have initiated

the military coup by many Nigeriens and international observers due to the report that he was going to be dismissed as the head of presidential guard in the following day as well as the disputes between Bazoum and Tiani over the budget of the presidential guard (Tschörner, 2023). This unpleasant scenario had demonstrated the state's infringement on fundamental human rights of the people, insecurity and embracement of various undemocratic practices as triggers of the resurgence of military intervention in the country.

From a wider regional perspective, the resurgence of military coups in West Africa with reference to the unpleasant situation and issues in weak state institutions, widespread governance, electoral fraud in attempt to prolong stay in power of President Ibrahim Keita was condemned by popular resentment which eventually led to coup in Mali. On the other hand, corruption and waste in government resources, deliberate alteration of the constitution to run for third term in office, political corruption, poor service delivery occasioned with poor infrastructure in bad roads and dilapidated hospitals under President Condé administration are issues that triggered military take-over of the civilian government in Guinea. Similarly, insecurity crises and poor economic management are majorly factors that triggered military coup that toppled the government of President Mohamed Bazoum.

CONCLUSION

The Burkina Faso's successive coups in 2022 showed vulnerable and failed system and institutions of a Sahel country. Thus, popular acceptance of military regime in place of a civilian government revealed frightening discontent against democracy.

Today, resurgence of military coup and regimes in West Africa is still rife as the Economic Community of West African States, ECOWAS battle fervently to dissuade its narrative and wave through sanctions. However, the unpleasant situation as indicated emanate from the failure of democratic institutions and processes under current civilian governments in the region. On the other hand, the regional euphoria for military coups and regimes cannot be justified as pathway for national transformation and development because of the democratic reversals currently witnessing in Burkina Faso. In this vein, Burkina Faso experience had showed that resurgence of military coup and regime is messianic to the myriad challenges bedeviling the country and region. Military coup and regimes are anti-democratic and cannot be justified as a panacea to national democratic development.

RECOMMENDATIONS

From the findings, the following recommendations were made:

1. Captain Ibrahim military regime owe the people of Burkina Faso public accountability on issues that led to two successive coups in space of months within the same year, 2022. The military regime should prioritize more in security of lives and properties of Burkina Faso people against Islamic extremism and terrorism.

2. The military junta in Burkina Faso should prepare and initiate a blue-print for democratic transition to civil rule. That measure will bolster the image and credibility of the regime in the region and the world.

3. The ECOWAS peer-review mechanism on governance should be reactivated and strengthened to persuade civilian political leaders in West Africa to become more committed to the principles and practice of liberal and electoral democracies in their respective countries. This measure will ensure transparency and public accountability in governance.

4. It is also advocated that the militaries of West Africa countries should acknowledge their roles in safeguard of democracy not over-throw of democracy. This professional orientation and advocacy as anticipated will bring attitudinal reorientation among officers and men of the military.

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